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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
MAX HUNSAKER, KATHLEEN
HUNSAKER, SUSIE M. HUNSAKER
AND RHEA H. BEVERLY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

.,yg-

THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION and POLLARD
INCORPORATED, a Utah Corporation,

Case No .
12854

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
Suit by grocer to enjoin widening of highway into
area used for customer parking, without condemnation proceedings, and to quiet title to the disputed area
against claims by Highway Department that said area
had been dedicated and abandoned for highway purposes.

DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
District Court held that disputed area had been
dedicated and abandoned to highway purposes, dissolved
the injunction against defendant and its contractor, Pollard Incorporated, and dismissed plaintiff's Complaint.
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RELIEF SOUGI-IT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek an order declaring that their property has not been dedicated and abandoned to highway
purposes, requiring the Road Commission to condemn
if they are to use it for highway, or in the alternative
for a new trial.
STATE.MENT OF FACTS
Defendants essentially agree with the statement
of facts as set forth by appellants, except in the following particulars:
Plaintiff, in referring to the disputed strip of
land 16..5 feet wide which lies south of the asphalted
traffic lane makes reference to its use for many years
for gasoline pumps and for parking of plaintiff's
customers and suppliers, but neglects to state further
that it also has been used for a highway drain (R-119),
pole lines ( R-119) , storage of snow removed from defendant's highway (R-121, 122) and a sewer line
(R-155).
1.

Respondent disputes the allegation of appellant in the first paragraph of his Statement of Facts
where he savs, "Unless the Road Commission can
establish
the disputed strip has been dedicated and
abandoned to the public for highway purposes within
the meaning of 27-12-89, UCA, 1953, the I-Iighway Department has no claim to that strip." To the contrary,
2.
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the facts show that the patent to the property in question issued on January 30, 1908, and was recorded July
6, 1908, (Exhibit 18-P, page No. 6), and was subject
to
1:·
" ... any easement or right-of-way of the
public to use such highways as may have been
established according to law over the same or
any part thereof.... "
Appellants concede that the center line survey of
18:36 established the fact that a highway existed at that
time and it is therefore just as reasonable to say the
burden is on appellant to establish that the highway
right of way is not a 66-foot right of way as respondents
assert. This is consistent with the revised laws of 1898,
Section 1117, Title 25, ( R-50), and this is i:iot a fact but
the question which the court must decide.
Respondent's Exhibit 39-D, a drawing prepared by defendant, State Road Commission's employees, shows the exact distance of appeJlant's store
to be 32.5 feet from the center line of the road known
as 3500 South Street. This enter line is also the north
property line of appellant's property and coincides with
the location of fence lines in the area. Plaintiff's own
witness, Wendell Jones testified that they had been in
their present location as long as he could remember
which was before the Hunsaker .Market building was
constructed, (R-132) and this would have been after
3.
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1912, the time of his birth, and prior to 1920 when the
store was built. (R-130)
ARGU.l\IENT
POINT 1.
THAT THE STATE OF UTAH SUSTAINED ANY BURDEN IT l\IAY
IIAVE HAD TO PROVE THAT
PLAINTIFFS IIAD DEDICATED
AND ABANDONED TI-IE DISPUTED
PROPERTY TO HIGHWAY PURPOSES BY PERMITTING PUBLIC
USE FOR TEN YEARS.
Point I of Appellant's brief contends that the Respondent, State of Utah, had the burden of proving
dedication and abandonment to public use by user for
a period of ten years. Respondents are of the opinion
that they had no burden as alleged by Appellant in
this connection for the reason that the records show
that a roadway was in existence at the present location
of 3;j()() South in Salt Lake County as early as 1856.
( R-44, 45) The abstract introduced by plaintiff which
is Exhibit 18-P shows the first entry to be a land certificate issued December 31, 1881. J;-.urther, the record
shows that the patent which issued in 1908 is subject
to, "any existing right-of-way." It is, therefore, the
Respondent's contention that the only burden which
the State of Utah had in this connection is the burden
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of showing the width of the roadway existing at the time
the patent issued. Respondents submit that both statutory law and case law support Respondent's contention
that it has a 66-foot right-of-way, 33-feet of which would
be south of the center line of the highway and upon Appellant's property. 'fhe case of Whitesides v. Green,
(1896) 13 U. 341, 44 P. 1032, states,
" ... that where there is no other evidence
of dedication than mere user by the public the
presumption is not necessarily limited to the
traveled path, but may be inferred as extend
ing to the ordinary width of highways, or, if
the road being enclosed with fences, to include
the entire space so enclosed ... "
The TJThitesides case was preceded by the case of
Burroughs v. Guest, 5 U. 91 12 P 847, wherein the court
stated the following:
" ... in determining the extent of the dedication, all the circumstances may be considered . . . The width of the highways in the
vicinity of the land in question, the width of
highways in a system in which the one in controversy forms a part, any circumstances of
recognition by the owner of the fee and the
public of definite and fixed limits...."
The court further stated the following in that
case:

11
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". . . The continued use of the lands by
the plaintiff was not absolutely as matter of
law, inconsistent with the casement created by
the right-of-way as a highway. The owner of
the fee has the right to use land in any way
not inconsistent with the requirements of the
public. . . . "
The later case of Jeremy v. Bertagnole, a case decided in 1941 by the Utah Court found in 101, U.l, 116
P .2d 420 states as follows:
" . . . whatever may be the width in any
particular case, the easement cannot be limited,
when acquired by user, to the actual beaten
path ...
A particular use having been established,
such width should be decreed by the court as
will make such use convenient and safe."
In the statutes of 1898, under Title 25, Chapter 1,
beginning with Section 1114, it is stated that all highways established shall have a width of at least 66-feet.
Anyone who does research into the law and cases decided between 1853 and 1920 continually runs into references to rights of way 66-feet in width, which is
equivalent to four rods, a unit of measurement commonly used during that period of time.
Assuming, but not admitting, that the State of
Utah did have the burden of showing user for a period
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of 10 years then Respondents respectfully submit that
sufficient evidence of user has been established by testimony and documentary evidence in the trial. Respondents submit that dedication and abandonment to the 1:
use of the public would constiute any useage customarily found within highway rights of way ordinarily permitted or licensed by highway authorities which in addition to the travt;led wa.y, include sidewalks, utility
lines and poles, sewer lines, water lines, highway drains
and drainage facilities and shoulders adjacent to the
traveled way. In the instant case, the record is replete
with evidence of part or all of these useages including
utility lines and poles, (R-119) highway drains immediately in front of Appellant's property, (R-119) sewer
lines, ( R-155) water lines, and in addition, the evidence shows that Respondents customarily push snow
from the highway surface onto the strip of disputed
land and they have historically done so and that this has
continued despite the request of Appellant to cease and
desist. (R-122) In this connection the Respondents submit that most of these uses were, in fact, not objected
to by Appellants and that this is evidence of user as set
forth in the annotation found in 52 A.L.R. 2d 263,
which annotation refers to the case of A. C. Graff, Respondent v. The City of Casper, 281 P.2d 685, a Wyoming case decided in 1955, involving utility lines.
Additionally, Respondents submit that the width
of the highway in question should be determined by
reference to the usual width of the highways in the area
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and of the highway system of which this one is a part.
Numerous exhibits including the following: 1-P
through 16-P, 25-D through 35-D and 49-D, which
are all photographs taken at various times, show that
the fence lines encompass rights of way 66-feet in
width to the east and west of the property in question.
The usual width as enunciated by the Legislature of the
State of Utah in 1898, (R-50) and again in 1909, (Exhibit 34-D) established the width for the system of
highways of which 3500 South is a part at 66-feet, or
four rods, and this is consistent with both case law and
statutory Jaw then applicable. Particularly significant
is Section 1117, supra, which provides that all public
highways shaJl be at least 66 feet wide.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT
TRIAL SHO\VS AT
THAT APPELLAN'l"S USE OF THE AREA IN
l 1'RONT OF THEIR PROPERTY
\VITHIN THE
RIGHT OF
'1\T A Y 'VAS BY ACQUIESENCE OF
RESPONDENT.
Appellants in Point II of their Brief use a "bootstrap argument" to the effect that the rights of Respondent are limited to those rights "dedicated" and
"abandoned" by plaintiffs and their predecessors in
title and state that there is evidence that plaintiffs and
their predecessors dedicated only 161h feet to highway
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purposes and actually retained the right to use the other
161h feet for customer parking. Respondents submit
that the evidence does not, in fact, substantiate Appellants allegation for the reason that the store was allegedly constructed in approximately 1920. Since that time
the area in front of the building has been utilized for
customer parking and dispensing of gasoline from
pumps placed within the disputed 16.5 feet area. Respondents submit further, that this wholly ignores the
fact that the evidence also shows that there were fence
lines in existence in the area to either side of the subject
property prior to the construction of the store which encompassed an area 66 feet in width, that a road existed
prior to the issuance of the patent and apparently prior
to the acquisition of an ownership right to the property
traversed by the highway by any individual, and further
that the building in question owned by Appellants was
constructed 32.5 feet from center line or in effect on
the edge of the 33 foot right of way claimed by Respondents. This is an implied recognition of Respondent's claim to the right of way over the north 33-feet
of plaintiff's property. Also, Respondents contend
that this ignores the other highway uses which Respondents have subjected said 16.5 foot strip to or
caused same to be subjected to by others, such as installation of utility lines and poles, installation and maintenance by Respondent's agents of a highway drain,
installation of sidewalks in the area, snow removal and
highway shoulders.
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Appellants assert that they and their predecessors
in interest always retained the disputed land for senice
station and parking lot purposes in connection with their
a<ljoining retail husmess. Re-,pcndents assert that evidence shows that this may have been tme from 1920 on
hut that same was <lone hy implied consent and with the
sufferance of the Respondent, Ctah State Road Commission and amounted, at most, to an encroachment
within the right of way which Respondent. State Road
Commission, had acquired prior to the issuance of the
patent to plaintif f"s predecessors in mos. Again the
lan,!-,11.rnge of the B urro11gh.'j ,._
decision, supra,
cited in Point X o. I regarding use of the area in
dispute by the fee holder is important. where it states
that the owner of the fee may use the property as long
as the use is not inconsistent with the rights of the
public.
Appellant cites the case of Pctcrsr)Tl •·. Combe, 20
C. :M :Jill. 4:38 P.2d j4j, as evidence that dedication
of prinite property to public use must be pro,·en by
clear and conYincing eYidence. Counsel for Respondent
is aware that the
inn)lH·tl in the Peterson 'l'.
Combt' case was
sub ied nf a subsequent law suit
institute1l by tht>
Hl1ad Cl1mmissinn of rtah
against \Yeher
:lwl tht> parties in the Pdcrson
'l'. Co111bt· case :nhl that in tht> trial L)f that proceeding
eYidem·e dearly and ctmYincingly pn)Yed that there was
a dedicatitHl hy user t)f tht> wad in question. The Peter·

sv 11

t'.

Comb,·

thus stands t\1r the additional propo-
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sition that counsel for plaintiff in that instance did not
submit the "clear and convincing evidence" that was
available. In this instance, Respondent takes the position that there is abundant "clear and convincing evidence", that the road now known as 3500 South has
historically been a main thoroughfare since at least
18.56. It at one time was a part of the Lincoln Highway, (Exhibits 36-D and 47-D) and it has historically
Leen referred to by the State Road Commission as one
of the important thoroughfares in the State of Utah,
(Exhibits 46-D and 47-D) and the road would not conceivably have been smaller in width than the minimum
width recognized and established both by statute, supra
( R-50) and case law, Burroughs v. Guest, supra, and
T¥hitesides v. Green, supra, at the time the property in
question was settled and immediately
thereto.
POINT III.
SURVEYS, COUNTY PLATS, AND
RECOGNITION BY APPELLANTS
IN CONVEYANCES CONSTITUTE
EVIDENCE OF RECOGNITION OF
RESPONDENT'S
TO A 33Ji'OOT RIGHT OF 'VAY.
Respondents at the time of trial introduced documentary evidence of area reference plats, (Exhibits
43-D) showing a 33-foot right of way parallel to the
section line which is also the center line of 3500 South
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which encompasses a 66-foot right of way with 33-feet
on either side of center line. These are official plats
of the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office and counsel concedes they do not explain how the right of way
shown first came to be shown, but presumably they have
a legal basis. Section 1122 of Title 25, Chapter l,
Statutes of the State of Utah for 1898, requires that
the county commissioners determine what public highways exist and that they prepare duplicate plats to be
on file in the office of the county clerk. No plat involving this particular property was submitted at the
time of trial since none could be found, however, further to the east about four miles in the area east of
Redwood Road on 3500 South, a plat of this nature was
found and sufficiently established a claim to a 66-foot
right of way by Respondent in another law suit involving a similar question to the one involved herein,
which decision is attached to defendant's memorandum
of authority in support of defendant's position. (R-52)
In addition, Exhibit 44-D is a 'Varranty Deed
involving two of the Appellants, Susie l\I. Ilunsaker
an<l Rhea H. Beverly, and described a right of way 20f eet wide over the west side of the property described
in the Deed, and the said described right of way commences 33-feet south of the north line of the entire tract
which describes to the center line of the highway known
as 3500 South, and constitutes an implied recognition
of a 33-foot right of way for roadway purposes.
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The Appellants, l\Iax D. Hunsaker and Kathleen
U. Hunsaker, in the contract by which they purchased
the property in question, (Exhibit 37-D), recognized
the same description which impliedly recognized the
33-foot right of way, and in February of 1971, clearly
recognized the 33-foot right of way in a Mortgage to
First Thrift and Loan Corporation, as shown in Exhibit
38-D and the trial .court correctly found that this was
a recognition by Appellants of Respondent's claim to a
33-foot right of way.
Respondents, at the time of trial, were prepared
to call a witness from the Salt Lake County Surveyors
Office to show that at least as far back as 1956, he
founcl road stones 33-feet from the center line of 3500
South in the area in question (R-181-189), and that
these .stones were placed by earlier surveyors to locate
the claimed 33-foot right of way which is now shown
on County Survey Records. (Exhibits 43-P and 50-P)
in the area of Appellants' property. Said witness was
not called but it was stipulated that if he were called
he would testify as set out above.
CONCLUSION
Respondents submit that the decision of the trial
court, holding that the area in dispute, had been dedicated and abandoned to highway purposes is the proper
conclusion and the only conclusion which is legally sound
in this matter.
Respondents submit that if, in fact, they had a
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burden to show that there was a dedication and abandonment of the property in question for highway purposes, that they successfully met that burden at the
trial of this matter. Respondents submit, however, that
Appellant had at least an equal burden to show that
the right of way claimed by Respondent, State Road
Commission of Utah, was less than the 33-feet which
said Respondent claims.
As Respondents have pointed out in this brief, the
statutory law of 1898 established minimum highway
widths of 66-feet. As also pointed out, this is consistent
with case law decided prior to that time in the cases of
Burrows v. Guest in 1886, and TVhitesides v. Green
in 1896, which were cases dealing with highways of
comparable widths. These cases apparently dealt with a
similar problem to that presented by Appellants, to-wit;
'Vhat is the extent of the dedication and abandonment?
It is interesting that the language of the cases talk
about, "widths of highways of which the one in question is a part, usual widths of fence lines and other evidence of recognition of set right of way widths by adjoining landowners, etc. . . " In addition, these cases
point out that the traveled way is not the governing criteria, hut that the dedication extends to the, "usual"
width, or, "necessary" width.
Respondents further submit that evidence adduced
in the trial shows that the rlisputed area of the claimed
right of way has been used for "highway purposes",
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when one considers the broad meaning of the term to
include utility lines and poles, drain lines, storage of
snow removed from the highway, etc. Respondents
submit that this proposition is legally sustained by decisions from other jurisdictions as cited herein.
Respondents further submit that the evidence
shows that the Appellants and their predecessors have
historically recognized the limits of the right of way
claimed by Respondents in conveyances, construction
of the building on the edge of the claimed right of way,
and that official documents on file in county offices,
as well as surveys, define and encompass the right of
way as claimed by Respondents.
Respondents respectfully submit that the evidence
shows that the road came first, that it was in existence
at least as early as 1856, that the rights of the public
were established first, and that Appellants and their
predecessors in interest took title to the property subject to the rights of the public. The law of the State of
Utah in effect at the time the legal title to the land in
question issued in the form of a patent in January, 1908,
made the land subject to rights of way which were then
established. The trial court was correct in its findings
and conclusions to the effect that Respondents have a
33-foot right of way as claimed. This fact was properly
established under both statutory and case law, and has
been recognized by Appellants and their predecessors
in interest and there is either a sufficient dedication and
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abandonment to sustain the claim of Respondents to
the 33-foot right of way ewer the north part of Appellant's property, or said property was acquired by Appellants and their predecessors in interest subject to an
existing, valid right of way as claimed.
Respondents respectfully iequest this court to affirm the decision rendered in the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. RO:l\INEY
Attorney General
LELAND D. FORD
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol

Salt Lake City, Utah 84II4

Attorneys f<Yr Respondents

